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Introduction 
The purpose of this paper is to analyze the US airline industry 
and provide an understanding of the industry itself, how 
companies in the industry are valued, and what the market 
assumes for their future potential.   
Background 
In a 1996 article titled “A Review of History, Structure, and 
Competition in the U.S. Airline Industry”, Gerald Cook describes 
the evolution of the airline industry from its origin after World 
War II through its maturity in the 1970s and through a fierce, 
competitive renascence after the Civil Aeronautics Board 
stopped regulating the industry and handed it over to the forces 
of the free market.  Before 1978, US airlines were regulated by 
the CAB against “unfair or destructive competitive practices” 
who controlled everything from prices, routes, and entrants and 
exits to the industry.  Ultimately, in attempts to grab market 
share, airlines began competing where they could by “increasing 
flight frequency, lowering seating density, and adding ever more 
extravagant in-flight service” which lead to poor performance, 
low load factors, and a push to deregulate the industry.  With 
this move, airlines were finally able to compete on prices and 
operational efficiencies leading to many innovations including 
the hub and spoke route systems.  The deregulation also led to 
many new entrants into the market, hoping to compete against 
established carriers.  Economic difficulties in the 1980s resulted 
in consolidations and bankruptcies, placing nearly 80% of air 
passengers in the 8 largest airlines.  Since then, industry 
knowledge and technological advances have led to more 
efficient pricing and ticketing policies, among other things.  The 
paper concludes with a new market trend of the time, low cost 
carriers, about to shape the future of the industry. 
Literature Review 
“The Effect of Operation Performance and Focus on 
Profitability: A Longitudinal Study of the U.S. Airline Industry” is 
a study published in 2007 by Nikos Tsikriktsis that examines the 
effects of operational performance as well as the effects of 
quality of service on profitability for US airlines.  Tsikriktsis 
used two operational indicators, the load factor to measure 
flight utilization and a fleet factor to measure the utilization of 
aircraft, as well as two quality indicators, late arrivals and lost 
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baggage, to find effects on relative profitability as defined by 
operational profit/ operational revenue.  To isolate the effects 
of operational performance and quality performance across the 
industry, he controlled for the 10 airlines in the study as well as 
the changes in airlines over time.  He concluded that across the 
industry as a whole, improvements in both operational 
performance indicators were statistically significant and 
positive in predicting profitability, meaning increases in load 
factor and fleet factor are associated with increased 
profitability.  In addition, late arrivals was also statistically 
significant and negative, meaning increases in late arrivals 
decreased profitability, but only at a 10% level.  There were also 
differences between full service airlines and focused (low cost) 
airlines.  For full service airlines, only the operational 
performance indicators, load factor and fleet factor, were 
significant and positive, and late arrivals was statistically 
significant and negative for focused airlines.  
A 2010 paper by E. Suryani et al. published in Expert Systems 
with Applications 37 predicted air passenger demand for the 
purpose of developing policy related to runway and passenger 
terminal expansion.  In forecasting air passenger demand, they 
concluded GDP growth and population to have positive impacts 
on demand and airfare impact and level of service have negative 
impacts on demand.  They defined level of service in this study 
as the change of demand that results from a change in travel 
time times the time elasticity of demand.  Due to the negative 
time elasticity of demand, an increase in this metric results in 
lower demand, and thus has a negative value in the analysis.  
This conclusion show airline demand is cyclical in nature, 
following typical economic cycles. 
Despite demand being cyclical, Liehr et al. published a paper 
called Cycles in the sky: understanding and managing business 
cycles in the airline market in 2001 that shows the profitability 
cycles of airlines are impacted by endogenous factors.  They 
show that several operational factors within the industry are 
main causes of the cyclicality of the industry and the exogenous 
factors such as GDP and population growth are only responsible 
for the amplitude of the cycles, not the cycles themselves.  The 
first factor is aircraft ordering.  In attempts to grow market 
share, airlines need to grow capacity; however with fluctuating 
market conditions, growing capacity can lead to capacity 
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surpluses and thus lower margins.  To manage this cycle, the 
authors suggest that “counter-cycle ordering yields several 
advantages for a single carrier…” and that “the objective is to 
ensure a quasi-continuous inflow and outflow of aircrafts, 
regardless of fluctuations in the market.  This includes leasing 
over-capacities to other airlines”.  In addition to aircraft 
ordering to manage the business cycle, the authors show that 
shifting capacities from areas of low demand to areas of high 
demand help to manage over-capacity.  In conclusion, this paper 
shows that the business cycles observed in the airlines industry 
are caused by improper managing of demand and successful 
airlines can manage operational activities to smooth out 
cyclicality in profits. 
S.Y. Abed et al. published a study in 2001 that was conducted to 
forecast air traffic demand in Saudi Arabia to advise regulatory 
agencies and airlines predict demand.  Over the period of 1971 
to 1994, they considered 16 independent variables as 
determinates of demand.  They concluded that the best model to 
predict demand included population size and total 
expenditures, a figure very highly correlated with GDP that 
represents total expenditures, government and private, 
including investment expenditures. 
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Industry Overview 
The airline industry is a very large part of the global economy 
and helps facilitate economic growth and trade in its areas of 
operation.  In 2015 and 2016, around 1% of global GDP was 
spent on air transportation, however the profitability and 
maturity of the industry depends greatly on the region, with 
North American operations accounting for about 60% of 
worldwide profits in 2016 as reported by the IATA 
(International Air Transportation Association).  Additionally, 
airlines have been able to provide higher levels connectivity by 
nearly doubling the number of unique routes since 1995 while 
over the same period reducing the real transportation costs by 
over 50%.  One of the airline industry’s largest expenditure, 
labor costs, saw an increase of 6.5% in 2016 to keep pace with 
growing capacities, however this is expected to slow in the next 
few years as indicated by a survey of CFO sentiment conducted 
by the IATA.  This sentiment can also be observed in the 
© International Air Transport Association, 2015 . Economic Performance of the Airline 
industry. All Rights Reserved. Available on IATA Economics page. 
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ordering of new aircraft as they outpaced demand growth with 
fleet capacity growth in 2016, but this trend is expected to 
reverse in 2017. 
The airline industry faces several large risks, including 
terrorism, effects of potential crashes, employee relations, 
heavy regulation by the FAA and DOT, foreign exchange 
fluctuations, weather, and overall economic risk.  While these 
types are risks are found in many other industries, the airlines 
are especially susceptible to these.  For example, after the 
terrorist attacks of 9/11, the industry saw an initial shock 
decline of 37.8% in demand and a lasting effect of 7.4% 
according to a 2005 paper by Harumi Itoa and Darin Lee. 
An additional risk for the airline industry is the cost of using 
infrastructure.  This cost includes fees to airports to build and 
expand runways as well as to the FAA to support their 
operations regulating US airspace.  However, because there is a 
lack of competition in this space, these costs have been rising 
steadily and are being passed onto consumers. 
Another large risk in the airline industry is exposure to fuel 
prices.  Depending on market conditions, fuel spend can account 
for 18%-30% of operating costs and presents a huge risk to 
airlines, especially when the markets are volatile. To address 
this risk, airlines often use futures contracts one, two, even three 
years into the future to hedge against rising fuel costs and can 
account for upward of 40% of fuel spend.  Historically, the 
© International Air Transport Association, 2015 . Economic Performance of 
the Airline industry. All Rights Reserved. Available on IATA Economics page. 
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airlines have benefitted doing this, as the savings as a result of 
lower than market fuel prices more than compensated for the 
cost of the hedges themselves.  From mid-2014 to mid-2016, 
however, the price of oil declined around 60%, causing many 
airlines to exit hedged positions at losses in the hundreds of 
millions of dollars.  Seeing signs of stability in 2015 around $60 
a barrel, some airlines entered into new hedges, only to see 
prices decline further.   
The industry has been reducing their use of fuel, mostly through 
more fuel efficient aircraft replacing old airplanes. Newer 
aircraft are significantly more fuel efficient than older ones, and 
the industry has been improving fuel efficiencies 2.4% per year 
over the last 5 years.  The rationale behind ordering new aircraft 
is also twofold.  As Liehr suggested in 2001, increasing fleet 
capacity despite fluctuations in the underlying demand is 
crucial to staying ahead of competitors and increasing market 
share. 
As previously mentioned, the strongest regional performance is 
in North America.  Overall the revenue per passenger is falling, 
however margins are still strong thanks in part to lower 
regulatory costs than in other markets.  
© International Air Transport Association, 2015 . Economic Performance of 
the Airline industry. All Rights Reserved. Available on IATA Economics page. 
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Aswath Damodaran, a professor of corporate finance at NYU 
Stern School of Business, identified 18 companies In the United 
States with operations in passenger air travel.  Of these, seven 
are not traded on any major exchanges, one mainly contracts as 
a regional carrier for Delta, Alaska, and American, and one does 
not have operations that actually focus on air transportation.  
For the analysis in this paper, the industry will be defined by the 
remaining 9 airlines.  The largest 4 of these companies, Delta, 
Southwest, American, and United control 85% of passenger 
market share and 88% of total revenues, so the analysis will 
focus on these 4 companies. 
After deregulation of the airline industry at the end of the 1970s, 
the industry saw explosive growth in the number of carriers in 
the market; however since the economic hardships in the 1980s, 
airlines started to consolidate.  This consolidation has served as 
a major source of growth for airlines.  With the concentration of 
24%
16%
26%
19%
15%
Passenger Market Share, 2016
Delta
Southwest
American
United
Other
© International Air Transport Association, 2015 . Economic Performance of 
the Airline industry. All Rights Reserved. Available on IATA Economics page. 
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passengers and revenues skewed toward a small number of 
firms in the domestic market, it is uncertain if future 
consolidations will be a reliable source of domestic growth for 
the large airlines. 
To understand how these companies are valued in light of the 
effectiveness of their operational and financial performance, I 
will compare valuation methods within each company and 
across the industry.  I will use valuation multiples in addition to 
a discounted cash flow model, taking into account operational 
metrics and company initiatives, to arrive at these values.  The 
two multiples I will use are Enterprise Value/EBITDA and 
Enterprise Value/EBIT.  These two metrics value companies 
based on their operating profitability before taking into account 
the capital structures and differ with the effects of depreciation 
and amortization. 
Assumptions common for all DCF models: 
• Given the studies by S.Y. Abed et al. and E. Suryani et al., 
the long term growth rates for determining the terminal 
values are based on estimated long term GDP growth 
rates.  The expected domestic growth rate as reported by 
tradingeconomics.com in 2020 is 2.6% and international 
GDP growth estimates are higher, at 3.6% in 2018 as 
reported by the International Monetary Fund’s World 
Economic Outlook report in January 2017.  A 
combination of the domestic and international estimates 
are used for each company in proportion to their 
domestic/foreign exposure. 
• The EIA projects Brent Crude oil prices to rise into the 
upper $50s by 2018 whereas tradingeconomics.com 
projects in the lower $50s in 2018 with a decline into the 
low $40s using only ARIMA models.  Given ARIMA 
models weaknesses for projecting more than a few 
periods into the future and level of economic input used 
by the EIA, I anticipate rising jet fuel prices closer in line 
with EIA projections meaning jet fuel spot prices 10%-
15% higher than current levels. 
• Without additional knowledge, I will project other levels 
at their 3 year average or 2106 levels, whichever is 
appropriate. 
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For the analysis, I created a discounted cash flow model to value 
the companies.  A discounted cash flow model derives the value 
by projecting revenues, expenses, capital expenditures, net 
working capital and other items into the future in order to 
calculate free cash flows and discount them at the company’s 
weighted average cost of capital.  I will walk through the 
assumptions I made for Delta, and the same process extends to 
all 4 airlines.  
The items that are needed to project free cash flows are the 
operating revenues and expenses, current assets, current 
liabilities, capital expenditures, and debt.  Revenue accounts are 
projected using growth rates, depreciation and amortization is 
projected as a percent of capital expenditures, taxes are 
calculated as a percent of EBIT, accounts receivable are 
projected as days sales outstanding, and other accounts are 
projected as a percent of sales. 
• Given Delta’s new antitrust immunized joint ventures in 
Europe, their existing antitrust immunized agreements 
in Asia, new joint ventures with Aeromexico and Korean 
Air, I expect Delta to grow passenger revenues at 2.5% in 
2017, 3.5% in 2018-2019, and slow to 3% in 2020 and 
2021.  Given the assumptions above and the fact they 
receive about 30% of their revenues internationally, a 
long term growth rate of 2.9% is assumed for the 
constant growth beyond 2021. 
• Salaries are Delta’s single largest expense, representing 
25% of sales in 2016.  Delta re-negotiated contracts with 
labor unions who represent around 80% of their 
employees and resulted in large raises for their 
employees.  Because of this, I project salaries to remain 
at 25% of sales, over the 22% average for the past 3 
years. 
• Fuel expenditures are at a low as a percent of sales, 
declining from 29% in 2014 to 13% in 2016.  With the 
sentiment that fuel prices will begin to rise in the future, 
I expect their fuel costs to rise 15% in 2019 and remain 
at those levels. 
• I project net working capital levels as well as capital 
expenditure levels to remain at current levels, as the 
company did not highlight any specific initiatives that 
would change them.  Currently, they are not accelerating 
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the retirement of old aircraft and will continue to replace 
them at similar rates. 
After projecting the relevant accounts, operating income is 
calculated.  Taxes are then subtracted to arrive at net operating 
profit after taxes or NOPAT.  Depreciation and amortization are 
then added back, as they are non-cash expenses that lower 
taxable income but do not represent a cash outflow.  Finally, 
capital expenditures and change in net working capital are 
added back to calculate unlevered free cash flows.  These cash 
flows represent the cash generated by the company after 
accounting for the operations of the business, capital 
expenditures and working capital required to maintain the 
business, and before any interest payments on debt.  This means 
it is a representation of the cash generated for distribution to 
debt and equity investors and is important for investors to 
determine possible return on their investment. 
In order to find the value of the enterprise, I discount the free 
cash flows at the company’s weighted average cost of capital.  I 
assume that Delta is going to continue operating forever, but 
need to calculate a terminal value to their FCFs in order to 
actually discount these future cash flows.  For this, I use a 
constant growth rate that projects the value of all future cash 
flows based on the last year of projections in my model, 2021.  
By adding the NPV of the FCFs to the NPV of the terminal value, 
I arrive at the enterprise value, or the total value of the firm.  To 
find the equity value, I subtract total debt and add cash, then 
divide by the number of shares outstanding to arrive at the price 
per share.  Because of the sensitivity of the DCF model to 
assumptions made in projecting free cash flow, a sensitivity 
analysis is created to test the effects of different long term 
growth rates and WACCs.  This provides a range of values one 
could reasonably expect given the assumptions made. 
I then compare this value to the value found using a multiples 
approach.  EV/EBIT and EV/EDITDA provide a market based 
approach to value companies and are useful for comparing the 
value of companies over a range of multiples rather than just the 
industry average.  EV/EBITDA serves as a standard valuation 
free of the effects of capital structure, taxes, and depreciation 
whereas EV/EBIT takes into account depreciation.  Airlines 
have large capital expenditures, so accounting for the effects of 
that by using EV/EBIT together with EV/EBITDA should 
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provide a better valuation.  For the airlines, I calculated the 
average EV/EBITDA ratio to be 5.40 with a standard deviation 
of 0.74 and the average EV/EBIT ratio to be 7.28 with a standard 
deviation of 0.99, creating the ranges I will use to value them.  
The results of these valuations can be seen in the football field 
charts in the analysis section. 
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Ticker: DAL
Year: 2016
Company Description: Market Cap 12-30-16
36,223                                        
Market Share 2016
Passengers:
24%
Revenues:
25%
Major Threats:
Load Factor
84.6
Operating Profit per ASM
Major Advantages: 0.43
Growth Cash Flows
DAL Industry Average DAL Industry Average
Sales Growth -2.6% 2.2% Capex/Sales 8.6% 12.6%
Net Income Growth -3.4% 2.4% FCF Margin 9.6% 7.5%
Efficiency Ratios Valuation
DAL Industry Average DAL Industry Average
Days Sales Outstanding 18.8 11.56 P/E Ratio 9.25 11.05
Days Inventory 18.18 15.16 Price to Book 2.93 3.83
Payables Period 60.85 31.25 Price to Sales 0.93 1.30
Divd Yield 1.06 0.64
Profitability 2016 Liquidity Ratios
DAL Industry Average DAL Industry Average
EBITDA Margin 22% 24% Current Ratio 0.49 0.87
Operating Margin 18% 18% Quick Ratio 0.35 0.73
ROA 8.38 8.95 Financial Leverage 4.17 4.52
ROE 37.80 35.01 Debt/Equity 0.5 1.34
ROIC 22.54 17.28
Delta Air Lines, Inc.
Delta Air Lines is a full service airline headquartered in Atlanta, GA.  They 
provide air transportation services for passengers and cargo in the United 
States and internationally.  They utilize a hub-spoke model to extend their 
operations to every major market in the work, and contract with 
international carriers to reach foreign markets outside the US and regional 
carriers domestically to reach smaller markets.
Buying jet fuel in the open market and using a portfolio to counter costs, 
taking minority, non-controlling stakes in foreign operators relies on the 
management teams of other companies, higher fares and the rise of low 
cost carriers
Strategic agreements and financial stakes in foreign carriers allows for 
easier international expansion, operating a fleet of older aircraft in 
conditions of lower fuel costs reduces capital expenditure requirements
 $-
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Assumptions for Delta DCF: 
• With lower growth potential in the United States, Delta is 
focusing on foreign markets to provide growth.  They 
have plans in 2017 to expand hubs in London, Paris, and 
Amsterdam, helped by the approval of an antitrust 
immunized joint venture with Virgin Atlantic in addition 
to expanding existing joint ventures with Air France-
KLM and Alitalia.  With antitrust immunity approval with 
Aeromexico, they plan to own 49% of Aeromexico’s stock 
and implement this plan in the second half of 2017.  Asian 
growth is helped by partnerships with multiple Asian 
airlines and expanding stakes in China Eastern.  Delta 
derives about 70% of revenues from domestic flight. 
Assumptions:
Tax Rate 33%
WACC 9.0%
Long Term Growth Rate 2.9%
2014 2015 2016 CAGR 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021
Revenue 40,362           40,704        39,639        -1% 40,792       42,468       44,223       45,874       47,601       
% growth 1% -3% 3% 4% 4% 4% 4%
Operating Expenses 38,156           32,902        32,687        -7% 33,264       35,055       36,945       38,325       39,768       
% of revenue 95% 81% 82% 82% 83% 84% 84% 84%
Operating Income 2,206             7,802          6,952          78% 7,529          7,413          7,277          7,549          7,833          
% of revenue 5% 19% 18% 18% 17% 16% 16% 16%
Taxes (413)               (2,631)         (2,263)         (2,451)        (2,413)        (2,369)        (2,457)        (2,550)        
NOPAT 1,793             5,171          4,689          62% 5,078          5,000          4,908          5,092          5,283          
+ Depreciation and Amortization 1,771             1,835          1,902          1,806          1,881          1,958          2,031          2,108          
- Capex 2,249             2,945          3,391          3,221          3,353          3,491          3,622          3,758          
- Inc (dec) in Net Working Capital (781)            682             (587)            (344)            (360)            (339)            (355)            
Unlevered Free Cash Flow 1,315             4,842          2,518          4,251          3,872          3,735          3,840          3,988          
Enterprise Value Sensitivity Analysis - Enterprise Value
NPV of FCF 15,340           Long Term Growth Rate
Adjusted for Mid-Year Convention 16,018           28,338  1.9% 2.4% 2.9% 3.4% 3.9%
Implied Terminal Value 66,823           8.0% 28,658       29,820       31,210       32,902       35,007       
PV of Terminal Value 12,320           8.5% 27,554       28,544       29,712       31,108       32,808       
Enterprise Value 28,338           9.0% 26,584       27,439       28,434       29,607       31,010       
9.5% 25,722       26,468       27,327       28,327       29,506       
Equity Value 10.0% 24,950       25,607       26,356       27,219       28,223       
Cash and Cash in excess of operating 2,762             
Total Debt 7,332             
Equity value 23,768           
Shares Outstanding 736.385
Price Per Share 32.28$           
Actuals Projected
W
A
C
C
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• Given Delta’s older fleet they continue to have non-fuel 
unit cost growth less than 2% however with less fuel 
efficient planes in a rising fuel price environment, I 
expect fuel costs to begin to rise again.  
• Salaries will continue to rise, as Delta approved an 18% 
pay raise for pilots in 2016 in addition to a 14.5% 
increase in base pay to ground and flight crews as a part 
of their profit sharing plan. 
• I expect the tax rate to remain in line with 2016 levels, a 
decline from previous years as a result of global tax 
changes.  They also have $5.9 billion in loss 
carryforwards which do not expire until 2027. 
 
 
Current EV $40,306 
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Ticker: LUV
Year: 2016
Company Description: Market Cap 12-30-16
30,681                                        
Market Share 2016
Passengers:
16%
Revenues:
13%
Major Threats:
Load Factor
84
Operating Profit per ASM
Major Advantages: 1.3
Growth Cash Flows
LUV Industry Average LUV Industry Average
Sales Growth 3.1% 2.2% Capex/Sales 10.0% 12.6%
Net Income Growth 2.9% 2.4% FCF Margin 11.0% 7.5%
Efficiency Ratios Valuation
LUV Industry Average LUV Industry Average
Days Sales Outstanding 9.11 11.56 P/E Ratio 13.29 11.05
Days Inventory 19.29 15.16 Price to Book 3.82 3.83
Payables Period 9.4 31.25 Price to Sales 1.53 1.30
Divd Yield 0.69 0.64
Profitability 2016 Liquidity Ratios
LUV Industry Average LUV Industry Average
EBITDA Margin 24% 24% Current Ratio 0.66 0.87
Operating Margin 18% 18% Quick Ratio 0.56 0.73
ROA 10.06 8.95 Financial Leverage 2.76 4.52
ROE 28.41 35.01 Debt/Equity 0.33 1.34
ROIC 20.21 17.28
Southwest Airlines Co
Southwest Airlines is based in Dallas, TX and provides domestic and near-
international passenger.  They are cost focused, utilizing point-to-point 
services as opposed to the hub-spoke model.  They operate with a single 
type of aircraft to simplify scheduling, maintenance, operations and 
training.  They offer a price advantage to other domestic airlines.
Lack of strategic alliances with foreign carriers, unusually high sensitivity to 
substitute goods (ground transportation) especially in economic downturns, 
competition from ultra-low cost carriers eating away competitive advantage
Improving fuel efficiencies with aircraft modification and new aircraft, 
industry leading customer service with 2 free checked bags, free checked 
stroller, no reservation change fees, and lower fares
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Assumptions for Southwest DCF: 
• Implementation of new, fuel efficient aircraft will start in 
Q4 of 2017 reducing fuel costs by 20% over the existing 
airplanes.  Even with expected rising fuel costs, this 
efficiency will help decrease fuel costs over time.  They 
are reducing their use of fuel hedges as a result of huge 
losses, so with new fuel efficiencies and rising prices, I 
anticipate gradually increasing fuel costs 
• Extended contracts with employee groups at higher 
levels, keeping salary level consistent with 2016 as these 
contracts extend until 2019-2022 
• Freight demand is lagging, expect similar levels as 2016 
Assumptions:
Tax Rate 34.7%
WACC 8.8%
Long Term Growth Rate 2.6%
2014 2015 2016 CAGR 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021
Revenue 18,605           19,648        20,425        5% 21,308       22,673       23,813       24,768       25,584       
% growth 6% 4% 4% 6% 5% 4% 3%
Operating Expenses 16,380           15,704        16,665        1% 17,142       18,499       19,906       20,705       21,387       
% of revenue 88% 80% 82% 80% 82% 84% 84% 84%
Operating Income 2,225             3,944          3,760          30% 4,166          4,173          3,907          4,064          4,197          
% of revenue 12% 20% 18% 20% 18% 16% 16% 16%
Taxes 680                1,298          1,303          1,444          1,446          1,354          1,408          1,455          
NOPAT 2,905             5,242          5,063          32% 5,610          5,619          5,261          5,472          5,652          
+ Depreciation and Amortization 938                1,015          1,221          1,300          1,383          1,453          1,511          1,561          
- Capex 1,748             2,041          2,038          2,170          2,309          2,425          2,522          2,605          
- Inc (dec) in Net Working Capital (3,382)         1,036          (715)            (196)            (164)            (137)            (117)            
Unlevered Free Cash Flow 2,095             7,598          3,210          5,455          4,890          4,452          4,598          4,725          
Enterprise Value Sensitivity Analysis - Enterprise Value
NPV of FCF 18,966           Long Term Growth Rate
Adjusted for Mid-Year Convention 19,786           32,834  1.6% 2.1% 2.6% 3.1% 3.6%
Implied Terminal Value 77,777           7.8% 33,206       34,415       35,856       37,604       39,769       
PV of Terminal Value 13,048           8.3% 32,026       33,059       34,274       35,722       37,478       
Enterprise Value 32,834           8.8% 30,984       31,878       32,916       34,136       35,591       
9.3% 30,055       30,836       31,734       32,777       34,002       
Equity Value 9.8% 29,218       29,907       30,692       31,594       32,641       
Cash and Cash in Equivalents 1,680             
Total Debt 3,387             
Equity value 31,127           
Shares Outstanding 615.598
Price Per Share 50.56$           
Actuals Projected
W
A
C
C
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• Other revenues grew as a result of agreements with 
Chase and early check in policies. Expected to continue 
to grow 
• Maintenance costs are expect to remain flat in due to a 
combination of retiring old aircraft and increased fleet 
capacity  
• Retiring aircraft leases will help keep rentals flat over the 
next 2 years 
• Depreciation is expected as moderately higher levels due 
to accelerated depreciation of older aircraft and the 
receiving of new aircraft 
• Nearly 100% of revenues from domestic flights 
 
Current EV $31,378 
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Ticker: AAL
Year: 2016
Company Description: Market Cap 12-30-16
24,191                                        
Market Share 2016
Passengers:
26%
Revenues:
26%
Major Threats:
Load Factor
81.7
Operating Profit per ASM
Major Advantages: -0.11
Growth Cash Flows
AAL Industry Average AAL Industry Average
Sales Growth -2.0% 2.2% Capex/Sales 14.3% 12.6%
Net Income Growth -64.8% 2.4% FCF Margin 2.0% 7.5%
Efficiency Ratios Valuation
AAL Industry Average AAL Industry Average
Days Sales Outstanding 13.71 11.56 P/E Ratio 8.17 11.05
Days Inventory 22.43 15.16 Price to Book 6.26 3.83
Payables Period 36.16 31.25 Price to Sales 0.64 1.30
Divd Yield 1.07 0.64
Profitability 2016 Liquidity Ratios
AAL Industry Average AAL Industry Average
EBITDA Margin 18% 24% Current Ratio 0.74 0.87
Operating Margin 13% 18% Quick Ratio 0.57 0.73
ROA 5.37 8.95 Financial Leverage 13.55 4.52
ROE 56.82 35.01 Debt/Equity 5.94 1.34
ROIC 11.98 17.28
American Airlines Group Inc
American Airlines is a major carrier providing passenger and cargo 
transportation domestically and internationally.  They operate a hub-spoke 
business model utilizing regional and international partners to increase their 
market reach. They are a founding member of the oneworld alliance, and 
airline alliance used by member airlines to provide better connectivity 
around the world.
No hedging contracts resulting in full exposure to price fluctuations; Very 
high levels of debt, a lot at floating rates, limit the ability to fund large 
capital requirements; Large pension obligations
Young fleet of aircraft funded with capital expenditures expected to pay off 
in fuel and maintenance costs and investment in network capacity; Finally 
achieving synergies from 2013 merger with US Airways
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Assumptions for American Airlines DCF: 
• Do not have outstanding fuel hedges, so I expect fuel 
costs to gradually increase 
• Renegotiated contracts with employee groups in 2016, 
resulting in a 13.2% increase in salary and wages 
expenses, expected to remain high into the future 
• Capital expenditures cannot continue to be supported at 
current levels. Financing with debt in 2016 alone raised 
$7.7 billion, bringing their total debt to around $24 
billion.  They also have contractual obligations hovering 
around $11 billion per year for the next 5 years.  This 
puts significant limits on their ability to finance capital 
expenditures and requires very high levels of liquidity. 
Assumptions:
Tax Rate 31%
WACC 6.7%
Long Term Growth Rate 2.9%
2014 2015 2016 CAGR 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021
Revenue 42,676           40,938        40,163        -3% 41,062       42,348       43,686       44,888       46,132       
% growth -4% -2% 2% 3% 3% 3% 3%
Operating Expenses 38,410           34,749        34,859        -5% 35,554       37,249       38,426       39,483       40,577       
% of revenue 90% 85% 87% 87% 88% 88% 88% 88%
Operating Income 4,266             6,189          5,304          12% 5,508          5,099          5,260          5,405          5,555          
% of revenue 10% 15% 13% 13% 12% 12% 12% 12%
Taxes 320                (3,452)         1,662          1,726          1,598          1,648          1,694          1,741          
NOPAT 3,946             9,641          3,642          -4% 3,782          3,501          3,612          3,711          3,814          
+ Depreciation and Amortization 1,301             1,364          1,525          1,642          1,694          1,747          1,796          1,845          
- Capex 5,311             6,151          5,731          3,285          3,388          3,495          3,591          3,691          
- Inc (dec) in Net Working Capital (1,966)         72                (202)            (117)            (122)            (110)            (114)            
Unlevered Free Cash Flow (64)                 6,820          (636)            2,342          1,925          1,987          2,026          2,083          
Enterprise Value Sensitivity Analysis - Enterprise Value
NPV of FCF 8,587             Long Term Growth Rate
Adjusted for Mid-Year Convention 8,870             19,829  1.9% 2.4% 2.9% 3.4% 3.9%
Implied Terminal Value 56,240           5.5% 20,596       22,514       25,170       29,091       35,461       
PV of Terminal Value 10,959           6.0% 19,095       20,552       22,479       25,148       29,087       
Enterprise Value 19,829           6.5% 17,900       19,046       20,510       22,446       25,127       
7.0% 16,923       17,848       18,999       20,470       22,415       
Equity Value 7.5% 16,104       16,868       17,798       18,954       20,432       
Cash and Cash in excess of operating 322                
Total Debt 24,344           
Equity value (4,193)            
Shares Outstanding 518.125
Price Per Share (8.09)$            
Actuals Projected
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• Depreciation will remain at high levels as they 
implement their new aircraft in their fleet 
• 70% of revenues from domestic flights 
 
 
 
 
Current EV $42,176 
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Ticker: UAL
Year: 2016
Company Description: Market Cap 12-30-16
23,124                                        
Market Share 2016
Passengers:
19%
Revenues:
24%
Major Threats:
Load Factor
82.9
Operating Profit per ASM
Major Advantages: -0.3
Growth Cash Flows
UAL Industry Average UAL Industry Average
Sales Growth -3.5% 2.2% Capex/Sales 8.8% 12.6%
Net Income Growth -69.2% 2.4% FCF Margin 6.3% 7.5%
Efficiency Ratios Valuation
UAL Industry Average UAL Industry Average
Days Sales Outstanding 11.64 11.56 P/E Ratio 8.55 11.05
Days Inventory 23.33 15.16 Price to Book 2.65 3.83
Payables Period 58.03 31.25 Price to Sales 0.66 1.30
Divd Yield 0.00 0.64
Profitability 2016 Liquidity Ratios
UAL Industry Average UAL Industry Average
EBITDA Margin 17% 24% Current Ratio 0.59 0.87
Operating Margin 12% 18% Quick Ratio 0.46 0.73
ROA 5.59 8.95 Financial Leverage 4.64 4.52
ROE 25.68 35.01 Debt/Equity 1.24 1.34
ROIC 12.48 17.28
United Continental Holdings, Inc.
United Continental Holdings is a holding company based in Chicago, IL.  
They operate United Airlines in addition to regional connections under the 
name of United Express using a hub-spoke model.  In 2016, 60% of their 
revenues were from domestic flights.   As a member of Star Alliance, they 
are a part of the largest airline alliance in the world, servicing 1300 airports 
in 190 countries.
Not currently hedging fuel prices; Commitments to purchase new aircraft 
and parts total $23.6 billion; Large debt obligations require large cash 
holdings and risks liquidity in the event of an economic downturn
Negotiated with all 11 labor groups, extending terms 2019-2022 making it 
easier to predict labor costs; Newer aircraft and modernization of fleet will 
help reduce fuel and maintenance costs
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Assumptions for United DCF: 
• United is increasing their fleet capacity faster than 
demand, so their load factor will decrease and their 
related expenses will rise similarly to 2016 
• Given their sensitivity to fuel prices, a $1 change in the 
price of crude oil would have a $95 million impact on 
their fuel spend or 0.3% of 2016 fuel expenditures.  This 
with the expectation of higher fuel prices, I will project 
fuel to grow moderately faster  
• Renegotiated contracts with their employees will incur 
approximately $900 million of additional salary 
expenses in 2017 
Assumptions:
Tax Rate 36%
WACC 8.0%
Long Term Growth Rate 3.0%
2014 2015 2016 CAGR 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021
Revenue 38,901           37,864        36,556        -3% 37,591       38,818       40,087       41,224       42,395       
% growth -3% -3% 3% 3% 3% 3% 3%
Operating Expenses 36,528           32,698        32,218        -6% 32,349       33,405       33,482       34,433       35,411       
% of revenue 94% 86% 88% 86% 86% 84% 84% 84%
Operating Income 2,373             5,166          4,338          35% 5,242          5,413          6,604          6,792          6,985          
% of revenue 6% 14% 12% 14% 14% 16% 16% 16%
Taxes (4)                   (3,121)         1,556          1,880          1,942          2,369          2,436          2,505          
NOPAT 2,377             8,287          2,782          8% 3,362          3,471          4,235          4,356          4,479          
+ Depreciation and Amortization 1,679             1,819          1,977          1,853          1,913          1,976          2,032          2,090          
- Capex 2,005             2,747          3,223          3,021          3,119          3,221          3,313          3,407          
- Inc (dec) in Net Working Capital 375             (391)            (230)            (170)            (176)            (158)            (162)            
Unlevered Free Cash Flow 2,051             6,984          1,927          2,424          2,435          3,166          3,233          3,325          
Enterprise Value Sensitivity Analysis - Enterprise Value
NPV of FCF 11,477           Long Term Growth Rate
Adjusted for Mid-Year Convention 11,928           22,764  2.0% 2.5% 3.0% 3.5% 4.0%
Implied Terminal Value 68,170           7.0% 23,000       24,257       25,827       27,847       30,539       
PV of Terminal Value 10,836           7.5% 21,876       22,909       24,171       25,749       27,778       
Enterprise Value 22,764           8.0% 20,918       21,783       22,821       24,089       25,674       
8.5% 20,089       20,824       21,693       22,735       24,009       
Equity Value 9.0% 19,361       19,994       20,732       21,605       22,652       
Cash and Cash Equivalents 2,179             
Total Debt 10,767           
Equity value 14,176           
Shares Outstanding 317.286
Price Per Share 44.68$           
Actuals Projected
W
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• A labor dispute at a port in 2015 increased demand for 
air cargo, so the trend downward in 2016 was affected 
by this 
 
 
 
 
  
Current EV $30,329 
25 
 
Analysis of Results 
As clearly seen in the football field charts comparing the 
different valuation methods, there is a lot of variability in the 
valuations provided by the different methods.  Part of this 
variability stems from the nature of the airline industry itself, 
and the rest can be attributable to the operations of the 
individual companies. 
Capital Structure - The airline industry requires constant, large 
capital expenditures to stay ahead of competition in areas of fuel 
efficiency, seats per plane, fleet capacity etc. and as a result, 
leaves less free cash flows for distribution to shareholders or to 
invest in the business.  This means a lot of these costs are funded 
through the issuance of debt which can severely limit an 
airline’s ability to continue to borrow while also needing to 
maintain large levels of liquidity, reducing potential return for 
investors.  This is seen in American Airlines, as they currently 
have almost 50% of their capital structure financed with debt 
and about $8.8 billion in availability liquidity.  In addition, just 
to service this debt fully, they have about $28 billion of 
outstanding contractual obligations.  All of this puts enormous 
pressure on airlines to properly balance increasing capacity, 
maximizing load factors, and improving margins to attract 
investors.   
Major Risks - One factor that is hurting airlines’ financial 
performance is the labor unions.  Across all of the major airlines, 
about 80% of the employees are represented by unions, and in 
2016, most unions renegotiated contracts that provided double 
digit percent increases in salaries, and in the case of Delta, an 
18% increase for their pilots.  The Railway Labor Act gives 
airline employees the right to collectively bargain, so it is not 
legal for airlines to forcibly break up unions that exist, but these 
increases in salaries are unsustainable and cause almost a 
billion dollar increase in expenses per year in the case of United.  
Because of this, I have projected salaries as a percent of sales to 
increase, causing margins to get tighter. 
Another cost driver for airlines is fuel.  Airlines are inherently 
dependent on buying fuel but recently have been exposed to 
fluctuations in fuel prices.  With oil prices stabilizing and 
expecting to rise moderately in the future, airlines need to 
reevaluate their policies around fuel hedging and adopt policies 
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to help smooth out the effects.  In recent years, fuel hedging has 
cost hundreds of millions of dollars in losses due to falling fuel 
prices, but stopping fuel hedging programs is shortsighted.  As a 
result, I have also projected fuel expenditures to increase as a 
percent of sales, further reducing margins of these airlines. 
Value Driver - The main driver of value in a DCF model is sales 
growth.  These airlines operate in a very competitive and 
mature environment, meaning domestic growth beyond overall 
economic growth occurs by capturing market share from 
competitors.  This is the primary strategy for Southwest, as they 
have very limited international exposure and have to 
distinguish themselves to do this.  The other airlines are looking 
to international markets and joint ventures to drive top line 
revenue growth.  Given the risks the airlines laid out for these 
ventures and the declining revenues of the past few years, I did 
not anticipate this foreign growth to drive growth at rates that 
support their current market values. 
Market Comparison - It is apparent the market is more 
optimistic about the outlook for airlines then I have been.  
Except for Southwest, the value I found for the other three 
airlines using a DCF model undershot the value found in the 
market substantially.  In order for the value of the DCF to 
increase, either revenue growth needs to increase, margins 
need to increase, or capital expenditures need to decrease.  In 
the case of Delta, the market valuation can be achieved using a 
long term growth rate of 6%, an increase in operating margin by 
reducing fuel and salary spend to 3 year lows, or by decreasing 
capital expenditures by 50%.  I cannot support any of these 
assumptions as the market conditions simply do not exist to 
support that level of growth, the cost reductions, or the 
decreased investment in new equipment. 
Two things the market is pricing into Delta’s and other’s stock is 
increased ROIC provided by increasing dividends and share 
repurchase programs.  Because of these programs, ROIC was 
higher than WACC in 2014 for the first time since the 1980s.  
ROIC is expected to slowly decline over the next few years as 
share repurchase programs are scaled back, however this 
return of capital to investors may explain the higher prices seen 
in the market. 
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Additional Valuation Methods – In order to get a more complete 
sense of the markets’ expectations of airlines, Enterprise 
Value/EBITDA and EV/EBIT are used as valuation multiples.  
The major difference here is that EV/EBIT takes into account the 
depreciation whereas EV/EBITDA does not.  This is more 
important when comparing companies across industries where 
the capital expenditures and in turn depreciation are very 
different.  In comparing companies within an industry, one 
should expect these metrics to provide similar estimates.  
Overall, these metrics serve as proxies for operating cash flows 
which is good for airlines, as their main source of liquidity is 
operating cash flows.  A major concern using these metrics is the 
effect that items after EBIT play, mainly taxes.  This is less of a 
concern here, as these airlines operate in similar tax 
environments, however foreign exposure should be taken into 
consideration. 
In my analysis, the valuation of these airlines needs to 
incorporate aspects from all the DCF model, the EV/EBIT, and 
EV/EBITDA ratios.  The enterprise value ratios here serve as a 
good long term indicator of where an airline should be valued 
based on current and historical industry norms.  The DCF model 
adds in the complexities of the operations and initiatives of the 
individual companies to better value the capabilities of the 
firms.  Due to slow overall growth and a shift in corporate policy 
toward increasing dividends, I see the value of airlines in the 
future is their ability to maintain and grow dividends while 
capturing international growth.  This cannot occur without a 
constant focus on controlling costs, especially related to fuel and 
salary expenses. 
Conclusion 
The United States airline industry serves as a great example of 
the forces of the free market, the effects of government 
intervention, and the operation of a capital intensive industry.  
The deregulation of the industry, which according to supporters 
of government control would ruin the industry and drive prices 
so high the industry would no longer serve in the best public 
interest, provides a great before and after effect that makes a 
strong case for the free market.  The number of locations 
serviced by airlines is at an all-time high, the price of an average 
trip is at an all-time low, and service standards continue to 
improve as customers come to expect more for what they pay. 
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Despite all this, investors have been wary of investing in airlines 
as the risks associated with the operations of an airline have not 
historically been matched with appropriate levels of return.  In 
2014 airlines finally broke through and provided an ROIC above 
their WACC thus attracting investors and driving value.  As seen 
in the analysis, the industry is burdened with heavy capital 
expenditures which reduce the valuation provided by a 
discounted cash flow model.  To match the value provided by 
these models to the valuation seen in the markets, revenue 
growth would reach levels that are not possible (around 6%), 
margins would need to increase beyond what is possible (by 
decreasing fuel and salary expenses), or capital expenditures 
would need to be severally reduced (a 50% reduction) which 
would be detrimental in the long run operations of the business.   
EV/EBITDA and EV/EBIT are additional tools used to value 
airlines based on historic industry averages.  These ratios 
provided estimates that more closely matched current market 
values, however they do not take into account the additional 
information provided by projecting individual line items like in 
a DCF.  For these reasons, Delta, American, and United are 
overvalued as they do not have strong growth outlooks to 
support their current valuations. The operating model of 
Southwest should allow for additional market share in the US, 
supporting a higher valuation in the face of slower growth. 
Other further research that would help develop a better 
understanding of the valuation of airlines would include non-
standard metrics.  One such metric would be cash from 
operations – capex – borrowing.  This metric should show the 
generation of cash from the core operations of the business 
including effects of financing and reinvestment in assets.  
Finally, another distinction that could be made is separating the 
industry by classification of full-service airline or low cost 
airline.  With the differing operational strategies employed by 
these differing airlines, their valuations should have factors 
unique to the class that could make for more accurate 
valuations. 
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